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5Abstract: This article explores 
the Canadian Corp’s march to, 
and occupation of, the Cologne 
bridgehead after the First World 
War. It examines the reasons for 
Canadian participation in the 
occupation, assesses the impact of 
logistics on decision making and 
service conditions, and explores the 
experiences of Canadian soldiers 
while marching across Belgium and 
performing garrison duties in the 
Rhineland. The article contends 
that the logistical situation which 
existed in the immediate aftermath 
of the First World War prevented the 
Canadian Corp’s timely demobilization 
so Canadian leadership sought 
temporary duties for the corp which 
would gain prestige for the Dominion.
Just hours before the armistice of 11 November 1918 came into effect, 
there was a ferocious fight for the 
Belgian city of Mons. During the 
night of 10 November and into the 
following morning, vicious street 
battles raged as a combined assault 
by 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions 
sought to liberate the town.2 After 
putting up some stubborn resistance, 
the German Army retreated at 0420 
hours and the town – where the 
British had started their fighting four 
years earlier – was finally secured. 
The Allied armies had achieved 
victory, and celebrations rang out in 
towns and cities around the world.3 
The fighting was over. Germany 
had asked for terms and the soldiers 
would soon return home. But, for the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) 
and many other Allied soldiers their 
work did not end on 11 November 
1918. In fact, the Canadian Corps 
was about to embark on one of the 
more intriguing periods in its history. 
Instead of demobilizing and returning 
home, the corps began preparations 
for a march into Germany as part of 
the Army of Occupation. Half of the 
Canadian Corps trekked for 28 days 
across Belgium and Germany to take 
up garrison duties around Cologne 
and Bonn. This occupation of hostile 
territory was a first for the Dominion, 
as never before had Canada’s civilian 
soldiers been asked to garrison the 
home terrain of a European enemy. 
The operation was also conducted 
in a period of great tension, with 
social, political and economic chaos 
swirling in Germany, and under the 
cloud of looming negotiations in 
Paris. This brief period of Canadian 
participation in the occupation forces 
was very much a military operation 
conducted in an atmosphere of 
apprehended war. In short, for the 
Canadian Corps, there remained 
much to do after 11 November 1918.
Under the terms of the Armistice 
agreement, the Rhineland was to 
be divided into four occupation 
zones: British, French, American 
and Belgian.4 The British Army, 
which included the Canadian Corps, 
was assigned to the zone starting 
just south of Düsseldorf stretching 
south to Cologne and Bonn.5 Once 
in Cologne and Bonn, the Canadians 
and British were to establish heavily 
defended bridgeheads in preparation 
to advance into the German heartland 
in case resistance should make that 
necessary. The German armies had 
not been entirely destroyed, had 
retreated in good order and still 
possessed a significant capacity to 
continue the war. The occupation of 
the Rhineland was viewed as a critical 
deterrent.6 
The armistice provided the 
Allies with a mandate to occupy the 
Rhineland, but otherwise no specific 
orders were provided. Thus, from 
11 to 18 November, plans for the 
operation were quickly sketched 
out and revealed to the Canadians 
during a conference at British Army 
General Headquarters (GHQ) in 
Cambrai. General Sir Herbert Plumer 
informed Lieutenant-General Sir 
Arthur Currie that the Canadian 
Corps had been selected for the 
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This march was probably the sternest test of sheer endurance, as apart from bravery, that the division 
ever encountered. Food and smokes were short all the way, the men were filthy and covered with lice, 
and utterly worn out. The marches were very severe – anything up to twenty miles a day, the roads bad 
and the weather usually appalling.                           Reverend Kenelm Swallow, British 29th Division1
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6Army of Occupation and that its 
four divisions would form part of 
Second Army, leading the advance 
to the Cologne bridgehead starting 
on 17 November and continuing for 
30 days.7
Why was the Canadian Corps 
tasked with this assignment? Several 
answers seem likely. First, General 
Plumer knew he was going into 
hostile territory and was uncertain 
how the population would respond. 
He required reliable troops that 
would perform under pressure 
and Canada’s four divisions were 
recognized as among the best 
available.8 Second, the Canadian 
Corps was close by, the 2nd and 
3rd Canadian Divisions having just 
led the successful assault on Mons.9 
Third, although the Canadian Corps 
had tactical and administrative 
autonomy, it was still subject to the 
British High Command and would 
have to advance if so ordered.10 
Finally, General Plumer knew that 
Currie was keen to have the corps 
included. Currie was later quoted 
saying: “It was a great gratification 
and honour to us.”11
Yet, upon further investigation, 
the Canadian Corps was likely 
chosen for two other reasons related 
to logistics and Canadian politics. 
In the immediate aftermath of the 
First World War, demobilization was 
the main concern for most nations 
involved in the conflict. With the 
signing of the armistice, a huge 
rush ensued to get the Imperial and 
American citizen soldiers home as 
quickly as possible. The only certainty 
was there would be delays, despite the 
best intentions of military planners. 
The large size of the Canadian forces, 
a global shortage of shipping, the 
decision to return Canadian units 
via England where movements were 
delayed by dockworkers’ strikes, 
limited Canadian port facilities, and 
overcrowded Canadian railways 
would complicate and prolong the 
withdrawal of units from Europe.12 
In fact, the first Canadian division 
to leave France for England did not 
embark at le Havre until 9 February 
1919.13 
With the end of the fighting, 
military and political planners 
worried about soldier morale and 
discipline. Both Prime Minister Sir 
Robert Borden and General Currie 
knew that bored soldiers would find 
ways to create trouble. Thus, Borden 
was willing to commit the Canadian 
Corps to the Army of Occupation, 
at least temporarily, because it 
would engage the troops in a useful 
activity until they could be brought 
home.14 Canada’s involvement in the 
occupation of Germany was never 
meant to be a long-term commitment. 
As soon as it could be arranged, the 
four Canadian divisions would leave 
Europe.15 
Borden viewed the occupation 
as an appropriate role for Canada 
within the British Empire, one that 
would raise the country’s profile.16 In 
the aftermath of the First World War, 
he favoured the active participation 
of Canada in international affairs 
to sustain and develop the status 
the Dominion had won during 
the war as a leading member of 
the British Empire.17 In 1918 and 
1919, Borden was seeking ways for 
Canada to distinguish itself and gain 
international prestige. Involvement 
in the occupation of Germany was a 
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7chance for the Dominion to shine on 
the world stage and garner the world 
attention he desired. 
During the planning phase for 
the occupation, 11-17 November 
1918, Canadian military leadership 
knew the march to Germany was 
going to be difficult. Huge logistical 
obstacles needed to be overcome to 
feed and supply the 107,000 Canadian 
soldiers and 25,000 horses about to 
walk across most of Belgium.18 Yet, 
corps logisticians had reason to be 
confident. General Currie and his staff 
fully recognized the importance of 
logistical support and corps logistics 
had dramatically improved during 
the last year of fighting. From April 
1918 onwards, a number of positive 
changes had been implemented. The 
supply column and ammunition park 
were amalgamated into divisional 
Mechanical Transport Companies.19 
Extra transportation capacity was 
added at the divisional level resulting 
in one hundred more trucks per unit 
and greater mobility than their British 
counterparts.20 The pool of labour 
dedicated to supply and engineering 
was vastly increased. This large 
supply of labour meant that the 
engineers no longer had to beg, 
borrow or steal men from combat 
units to complete their various 
tasks.21 Finally, an affiliation between 
Canadian officers and closely knit 
teamwork had developed during 
the course of the conflict as General 
Currie resisted pressure to break 
up his corps. This familiarity led to 
greater trust between officers and 
more efficiency in the system.22
Streamlined administration, more 
trucks and more men produced better 
results. Damaged infrastructure such 
as train tracks, roads and bridges 
could be repaired or replaced quickly 
and efficiently. The infantry and 
artillery were adequately supplied 
during the set-piece attacks of 1918 
and it was now possible to pursue 
the enemy in more mobile warfare. 
For example, the Battle of Amiens on 
8 August 1918 was a small logistics 
success. It was not easy, but the 
combined logistical system provided 
supplies and ammunition for the first 
hours of action and rapid advance. 
Canal du Nord on 27 September 
was perhaps the best example of the 
manner in which logistical capacity 
for swift moving, complex operations 
had developed. The engineers quickly 
placed footbridges across the canal 
for infantry, and built pontoon 
bridges and roads for the artillery. 
In fact, the success of the whole 
operation depended on how rapidly 
large forces and vast quantities of 
supplies could be pushed across a 
limited number of canal crossings 
and sustain the fast-moving, multi-
pronged offensive.23
Yet, for all the improvements 
made to the logistics system during 
1918, deficiencies still existed and 
came to light when the system 
was under duress. For example, a 
huge problem with road congestion 
occurred during the move to the 
Amiens sector in July and August 
1918. Stockpiling sufficient supplies 
before the Amiens offensive proved 
difficult due to the erratic arrival 
times of the ammunition trains at 
the corps’ railheads and the long 
distances to the refilling points.24 
As the operation progressed and 
troops advanced further from their 
supply bases strains appeared in the 
A bridge built by Canadian Engineers across 
a railroad destroyed by the enemy. The 
Canadians are also rebuilding goodwill by 
offering a ride to a group of local youth.
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8system. It was a struggle to establish 
new ammunition and refuelling 
points and there were not enough 
men to clear the ammunition from 
the railheads. Pack trains arrived 
late, often delayed by 48 hours, so 
the infantry went hungry.25 At the 
Canal du Nord, serious problems 
occurred at the level of the British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF). The 
ammunition trains and divisional 
pack trains strained to keep up with 
the heavy demand and often arrived 
late. These problems in turn affected 
the Canadian Corps. On 1 October 
several lorries of ammunition failed 
to arrive for 1st Canadian Division 
and the resumption of the scheduled 
attack had to be cancelled.26 
The point is that logistical 
problems were nothing new to the 
Canadian Corps when it joined the 
Army of Occupation. It had already 
faced road congestion, erratic arrival 
of supply trains, shortages of food 
and ammunition, severely damaged 
infrastructure, lack of labour, and 
the difficulties associated with 
lengthening supply lines. During 
the final 100 Days, these issues 
were overcome, but the persistence 
of similar challenges during the 
march into Germany demanded 
undiminished effort.
C a n a d i a n  l o g i s t i c i a n s 
implemented significant changes in 
preparation for the advance to the 
Rhine. From 13 to 17 November, the 
system was streamlined, thereby 
easing the provisioning of the troops. 
To add flexibility and capacity, 
Mechanical Transport Companies 
were placed under divisional 
command and allotted extra trucks. 
Additional contingents of soldiers 
were detailed to unload at the supply 
refuelling points. Railheads were 
moved as far forward as possible.27 
Engineer brigades and machine gun 
battalions were to march as one unit. 
Specialized units, such as salvage 
companies, trench mortar brigades 
and burial parties, were disbanded 
and the soldiers ordered to return to 
their original units. To complement 
the organizational adjustments, some 
sacrifices had to be made. Stores of 
ammunition and divisional canteen 
supplies were cut. The plan to carry 
the infantry’s packs on trucks was 
scrapped. Unfit horses and remounts 
were left behind. All extra leave was 
cancelled and the divisions would 
be unable to supply showers or 
underclothes for the men.28
With a logistics plan in place, 
attention turned to another matter of 
great importance – the maintenance 
of discipline. Because specific 
information regarding the German 
military and political situation was 
unavailable, the march was to be 
held under wartme conditions. Allied 
military planners were uncertain if 
the armistice would hold and could 
only speculate on what reception 
the occupation forces would receive 
once inside Germany. The Allied 
armies also had a reputation to 
maintain. Discipline was essential not 
only to maintain fighting efficiency, 
but also to avoid international 
embarrassments. Specific references 
to troop discipline featured in almost 
every set of orders issued from 11 
to 17 November. In British GHQ’s 
“Orders for the Advance” of 11 
November, the very first item was 
the following: “The maintenance of 
discipline is of the highest concern 
during the period following cessation 
of hostilities. Breaches of discipline 
were to be repressed firmly and 
immediately.”29 General Currie was 
concerned with the reputation of his 
corps. At a meeting on 12 November 
at Canadian Corps HQ, Currie 
drew attention to the necessity of 
upholding the “smart and soldierly-
like appearance” of all the troops and 
avoiding laxity in saluting.30 
In General Currie’s “Special 
Order of the Day,” 25 November 
1918, he encouraged his forces to 
maintain a good appearance:
Above all, it is of capital importance 
to establish in Germany the sense 
of your overwhelming moral and 
physical standing, so as to complete 
by your presence of your potential 
strength, the victories you have won 
on the Field of Battle. All external 
signs of discipline must be insisted 
upon.31
Thus, during the armistice period, the 
Canadian Corps wanted to project 
an image of impeccable military 
correctness and professionalism. The 
Dominion’s involvement with such 
a high profile mission was a chance 
for the young country to share the 
international spotlight. 
On the cold, wet morning of 18 
November, the 1st and 2nd Canadian 
Divisions commenced their march, 
relieving the examining posts of the 
3rd Canadian Division and assuming 
responsibility for the front. Despite 
the poor weather, the march initially 
proceeded according to plan.32 
After two days of rest 1st and 2nd 
Canadian Divisions again continued 
the advance on 21 November and 
reached the general line Gosselies–
Nivelles–Lillois. However, problems 
were already starting to appear. The 
3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions’ 
marches for 21 November were 
cancelled.33 The supplies for 2nd 
Canadian Division were very late, 
making it necessary for the division’s 
quartermaster to draw dry rations.34 
Later, the scheduled marches for 22 
and 23 November were cancelled for 
all Canadian divisions. Many were 
left wondering what was going on. 
The British Army, which was 
supplying the Canadian Corps, faced 
huge logistical problems that were 
complex and difficult to solve in the 
short-term. For the march to Germany, 
the British quartermasters relied upon 
trains to supply the approximately 
eight hundred thousand soldiers of 
Second and Fourth Armies. Under 
normal circumstances, supplies from 
a base would be brought forward by 
train to the closest railheads. Trucks 
would then move the goods to supply 
refuelling points where they were 
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9picked up by the divisions, using 
another set of trucks. The problem at 
the outset of the march was the delay 
of the trains in getting to the railheads. 
Fighting along the Western Front had 
destroyed most of the railways in an 
area varying in depth from 30 to 50 
kilometres and extending the length 
of the British area in France. Military 
rail lines were promptly laid across 
the gap, but these could not handle 
the same volume of traffic as civilian 
lines.35 Furthermore, the quick repair 
of existing civilian lines proved 
almost impossible, the damage 
being so severe, and this placed an 
extra burden on functioning civilian 
and military rail lines. To further 
complicate matters, French and 
Belgian civilian traffic and armies 
in the midst of demobilization were 
hindering the movement of trains in 
the rear areas. All of these factors, 
coupled with a shortage of adequate 
rolling stock and locomotives, proved 
insurmountable and the British Army 
was forced to alter their plans for the 
occupation. 
British supply problems affected 
the Canadian Corps in two ways. 
First, the original march timetable 
was scrapped and a new one issued.36 
Second, the composition of the 
Army of Occupation was altered and 
only half of the selected divisions 
would proceed.37 On 23 November, 
General Currie received instructions 
stating that Canadian Corps HQ, 1st 
Canadian Division, 2nd Canadian 
Division and Canadian Corps Troops 
would move to the Rhine.38 The 
3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions 
would remain in Belgium and were 
transferred to IV Corps of Fourth 
Army on 24 November.39 
With a more sustainable number 
of divisions moving forward, the 
slimmed down Canadian Corps 
continued its trek across Belgium. 
From 24 to 28 November, it advanced 
four out of the five days. It was a 
punishing pace as the men marched 
for seven to eight hours each day, 
covering distances ranging from 20 
to 30 kilometres. At times, the men 
arrived so late they had to find their 
billets by flare light.40 On the road the 
troops had to carry a heavy load: full 
packs, a rifle, a blanket, ammunition 
and their steel helmets.41 Blistered feet 
and worn-out boots were common 
and many soldiers were evacuated 
with crippled feet. The mud and 
continual drizzle were depressing 
and the marching on second and third 
class roads difficult.42 To add to the 
discomfort, clean clothing, canteen 
supplies and proper showering 
facilities were unavailable most 
days.43 The extra chores such as 
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Top: British cavalry lead Canadian troops through the packed Belgian town of Namur.  
The third horseman in line leans over to receive flowers from a Belgian girl.
Above: Crowds throng the street in Namur as their Allied liberators pass through.
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mending, laundry, cooking and 
washing made a long march seem 
even longer.44 These discomforts 
were exacerbated by acts of random 
destruction by the retreating German 
army. In violation of the armistice 
agreement, German forces damaged 
the road and rail networks and 
detonated ammunition dumps. In 
some cases, entire switching yards, 
sections of rail and bridges were 
rendered useless. The German retreat 
through Belgium was not marked by 
a sustained campaign of destruction, 
but particular acts of demolition 
caused headaches and delays for the 
advancing Canadians.
Canadian soldiers had little 
choice but to accept the punishing 
pace. A peace treaty had not yet 
been signed, so Marshal Ferdinand 
Foch, supreme commander of the 
Allied armies, wanted to control as 
much German territory as possible 
in case hostilities resumed. Further, 
the armistice was set to expire on 
17 December, 36 days after it was 
signed.45 Marshal Foch wanted the 
Armies of Occupation in place, firmly 
entrenched in their bridgeheads 
before the agreement ended. As a 
result, General Plumer’s orders of 26 
November required the Canadian 
Corps to cross the German frontier 
on 1 December and the Rhine on 13 
December.46 With a reputation to 
maintain the Canadian Corps could 
not afford to be late. 
Relief from the boredom and 
exhaustion of marching in Belgium 
came whenever the Canadian 
Corps entered a town. At Nivelles, 
the vanguard of the 1st Canadian 
Division was greeted in the square 
by a dense crowd all cheering wildly. 
Colonel A.L Barry remembered that 
at Houdeng-Goegnies they were 
showered with flowers everywhere 
they went: “It was like Caesar 
returning triumphantly from Gaul.”47 
On 27 November, the Canadian 
Corps left the heavily populated 
lowlands of Belgium and began 
marching towards the Ardennes, 
in still more difficult conditions 
in the rugged and hilly region of 
eastern Belgium. Bad weather and 
muddy roads on 27 November were 
a hardship, and the celebrations 
were over; the journey became a 
depressing route march through 
a sparsely-settled district.48 On 28 
November, after an exhausting 
march, Canadian soldiers arrived at 
their billets to find that the logistical 
structures had failed them yet again. 
As the march continued across 
Belgium, supply lines were stretched. 
The railhead supplying the Canadian 
Corps was still west of Valenciennes. 
To reach the leading troops, trucks 
needed to haul supplies for over 
160 kilometres. The strain on the 
Mechanical Transport Companies 
was tremendous and delays were 
inevitable. Many trucks wore out due 
to wear and tear and a lack of spare 
parts, especially tires. Maintenance 
crews could not keep up with the 
volume of repairs.49 Furthermore, 
the muddy, narrow, twisting and 
unfamiliar roads caused the transport 
companies frequent misdirection 
and delays.50 As a result, from 28-30 
November rations failed to arrive 
for some units of the 1st Canadian 
Division and the soldiers went 
hungry. Corps leadership had little 
choice but to cancel marches for 29-
30 November. 51 The 2nd Canadian 
Division fared better and continued 
its advance with sufficient supplies 
of food.52 
Most units coped with the strain 
of hard marches and insufficient 
rations in the Belgian Ardennes. As 
Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Cooper 
wrote: 
The wagons are caked with mud, 
the steel is a bit rusty and we are all 
a little bedraggled. But the men are 
bearing up well. They are cheerful 
and smile, even though the road is 
tough.53 
When morale sagged and rations 
did not appear, the Canadian YMCA 
helped. Throughout the march, 
volunteers of the YMCA set up free 
drink stations and canteens at each 
rest stop that had been set up ahead 
of the line of march. Nevertheless, 
in some units thoughts turned to 
mutiny. As the Canadian Corps 
exited the Ardennes and approached 
the German frontier, platoons of the 
29th Canadian Infantry Battalion 
refused to parade until they received 
a proper meal. The commanding 
officer, Lieutenant-Colonel H.S. 
Tobin, handled the situation well 
and cancelled the parade because 
of rain (only one rain drop was 
felt that morning). He ordered the 
Canadian soldiers line up to receive hot 
drinks and other treats from a YMCA 
Canteen.
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men to polish kit in their barracks. 
Meanwhile, Lieutenant S. Fletcher of 
“A” Company managed to procure 
some supplies. By evening, after a 
good hot meal of Mulligan stew, 
mutinous thoughts in the battalion 
had evaporated.54 Elsewhere, three 
platoons of the 16th Canadian 
Battalion also refused to parade when 
rations were short. In this instance, 
the battalion commander, Lieutenant-
Colonel C.W. Peck, who had recently 
been awarded the Victoria Cross for 
his actions in September, talked to the 
men and the insubordinate platoons 
fell in and reached the battalion 
parade ground on time.55 It is unlikely 
that any soldiers of either the 29th or 
16th Canadian Battalions seriously 
considered mutiny, but when food 
fails to appear there is bound to be 
some grumbling. 
The Canadian Corps approached 
the German border on 3 December: 
1st Canadian Division at Petit Their; 
and 2nd Canadian Division at Beho. 
The crossing into German territory 
on 4 December was planned as a 
highly symbolic spectacle. General 
Currie issued a “Special Order of the 
Day” calling on all units to maintain 
strict discipline and not show any 
weakness whether on the march or 
at rest.56 The soldiers were reminded 
not to fraternize and to respect 
private property and the billets they 
would occupy.57 All kit had to be 
mended and polished. It was clear 
that Currie’s intent was to project an 
image of soldierly perfection. On the 
morning of 4 December, with Union 
Jacks and regimental colours flying, 
the Canadians crossed into Germany 
to the sound of pipe bands playing “O 
Canada” and “Maple Leaf Forever.”58 
Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Cooper 
captured the mood when he wrote, 
“The wildest Canadian dream has 
been to march to the Rhine and here 
today we are well on our way to 
Prussian soil.”59 By nightfall, both 
divisions had crossed the border. 
 Unexpectedly, the inhabitants 
of the Rhineland seemed almost 
Top: Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie (second horseman, directly in front of telegraph 
pole) and his staff follow a local marching band into the Belgian frontier town Petit 
Thier 3 December 1918.
Middle: Lieutenant-General Currie takes the salute during a marchpast of his troops 
in Petit Thier.
Above: Lieutenant-General Currie (left), flanked by Major-General Archibald Macdonell, 
commander of 1st Canadian Division, lead the Canadians into Germany. The border is 
marked by the striped pole to the left of Currie.
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12
relieved to see the British and 
Canadian forces. Unbeknownst to the 
Canadians, for many Germans, the 
Armies of Occupation represented 
stability and order in a country 
full of confusion. From November 
1918 to January 1919, Germany 
teetered on the brink of political and 
economic anarchy. Bolshevists and 
Spartacists threatened to tear the 
country apart. Although an armistice 
had been signed, the naval blockade 
of Germany remained in force and 
this meant dangerously low food 
supplies and a lack of raw materials 
to fuel the German economy which 
in turn led to massive layoffs.60 
Added to this volatile mix was the 
return of thousands of soldiers who 
increased further the high levels of 
unemployment. 
During their first day and night 
in Germany, Canadian soldiers 
observed two characteristics of the 
German people they encountered. 
The first was the cold and aloof 
reception from the local population,61 
in marked contrast to the festive 
atmosphere of the Belgian towns. 
The second notable thing was the 
compliant attitude of local civil 
officials.62 Local officials had in 
fact been ordered by the central 
government to cooperate with the 
Army of Occupation.63 Newspapers 
published the government’s edicts, 
spelling out to the people exactly what 
was expected of them: make room 
for the enemy, no fraternization, be 
friendly but distant.64 Local Catholic 
priests preached the same points 
from the pulpit.65 
After the corps crossed the 
German frontier, it completed the 
march to the Rhine over the next eight 
days, from 5 to 12 December. Aside 
from continuing supply problems, 
this final leg was completed without 
incident.66 The 1st Canadian Division 
remained grounded on 5 December 
because its supplies had failed 
for a third time, on this occasion 
due to a train derailment between 
Valenciennes and Mons.67 The daily 
marches averaged 16 kilometres, 
shorter than the 20 to 30 kilometres 
in Belgium.68
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With bayonets fixed, colours flying, and the band playing, the 2nd Canadian Division crosses the Rhine River at Bonn while General 
Currie looks on from the reviewing stand. Heavy rain and mist, evident in the photo, did not dampen the spirits of the troops who 
were well aware of the historic importance of this event.
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An urgent  te lephone  ca l l 
interrupted the routine of the march 
as the mayor of Cologne, Konrad 
Adenauer, pleaded for a quick 
occupation of his city. Adenauer 
feared civil unrest during the period 
between the withdrawal of the 
German Army and the arrival of 
the British.69 His fears were realized 
when the German Army withdrew on 
3 December and food riots erupted in 
the city and continued through the 
next day.70 A mob of approximately 
300 people looted stores and shops.71 
The Cologne civic guard managed 
to restore order, but only by firing 
their machine guns above the 
crowd.72 Realizing the situation 
was rapidly deteriorating, General 
Plumer ordered a small contingent 
of British cavalry and armoured 
cars to enter Cologne and seize 
strategic points on 6 December.73 
General Plumer also ordered the 
28th Brigade Group – including the 
Royal Newfoundland Regiment – to 
move to the suburbs of Cologne by 
rail. Thus, the first elements of the 
British Army reached the Rhine on 
6 December 1918, unheralded and 
without much fanfare.74 
Three days later the first Canadian 
troops reached the Rhine. The full 
strength of the 1st and 2nd Canadian 
Divisions arrived by 12 December.75 
It was almost miraculous that the 
artillery arrived on time, having 
had to march over 40 kilometres in 
one day to make up for delays. The 
1st Canadian Division was allotted 
billets in the towns and suburbs south 
and west of Cologne and the 2nd 
Canadian Division in villages west of 
Bonn.76 The soldiers must have been 
pleased: the long march was over; 
proper barracks, showering facilities, 
and good food were now available. 
Friday, 13 December was set as the 
date for all the Armies of Occupation 
to cross the Rhine. This was an 
occasion of great significance, more 
so than the crossing of the German 
frontier.77 As S.D. MacGowan wrote 
in New Brunswick’s Fighting 26th:
For the Canadians, it was one of 
the high points during the ravaging 
war and they were determined to 
parade at their best. It was a symbolic 
triumphant ending of the conflict, a 
proud and well-disciplined victor 
versus the humbled enemy. This 
spectacular march was a peaceful 
way for the Canadians to indicate 
their supremacy.78
The morning of the 13th dawned 
dark and a steady rain poured down 
the whole day. The leading troops 
of the Canadian Corps were soaked 
as they crossed into the German 
heartland. With their bayonets fixed, 
colours flying, and bands playing, 
the infantry marched over the river. 
General Plumer took the salutes as 
the 1st Canadian Division crossed 
the Rhine by the South Bridge in 
Cologne.79 Meanwhile at Bonn Bridge, 
General Currie stood for five hours 
taking the salutes from the soldiers 
of the 2nd Canadian Division.80 To 
the infantry’s relief, their heavy packs 
were being carried in trucks.
It took three more days of short 
marches for all units to reach their 
final areas of responsibility. Most 
units were in place by 16 December, 
just hours before the armistice was set 
to expire. At long last, the Canadian 
Corps’ long march was over.
The  focus  now turned to 
planning for the defence of the 
Cologne bridgehead. Lieutenant-
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General Plumer takes the salut as troops of the 1st Canadian Division cross the Rhine at Cologne on 13 December 1918.
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General Currie and his staff received 
directives from both Marshal Foch 
and General Plumer, but the details of 
the deployment were left to Currie.81 
Foch and Plumer instructed the corps 
commanders to keep the damage 
of local property to a minimum, to 
not advance past the 30 kilometre 
perimeter, and to deploy forces to 
facilitate reinforcement from west 
to east. Furthermore, owing to the 
dense population in the bridgehead, 
General Plumer decided that it was 
necessary to locate the majority of 
the Canadian Corps forces east of 
the Rhine. The exception to this 
principle was a force necessary 
to hold the left bank.82 General 
Currie also incorporated a variety 
of geographical features into the 
Canadian Corps’ defence scheme. 
Each divisional area had the 
following defensive features: an 
outpost line – to control all exits 
and approaches to and from the 
perimeter; a main line of resistance 
– composed of defended localities 
(if available) sited on the main 
tactical features of the area; and a 
support line, also based on defended 
localities. The defences featured 
infantry, artillery and machine gun 
positions. Each brigade posted one 
battalion on the outpost line; two 
battalions in the main and support 
lines; and, one battalion was held 
in divisional reserve. In support 
of the infantry, two brigades of 
heavy artillery took up positions 
on the high ground near Rosrath 
and Hangelar respectively. The 
remaining three brigades of heavy 
artillery were assigned to counter-
battery work and were positioned 
at Altenrath, Walsdorf, and an area 
near Rolandseck.83 Finally, two 
battalions of the Canadian Machine 
Gun Corps (CMGC) were located in 
an intermediate area, between the 
outpost line and the main line of 
resistance. The 1st and 2nd Canadian 
Motor Machine Gun Brigades 
(CMMGB) remained in corps reserve.
Not only did the occupation 
troops have to defend the bridgehead, 
but they also faced the daunting 
prospect of governing the people 
in their areas.84 Because no one 
could foresee with certainty whether 
hostilities might be renewed, martial 
law was declared and the military 
forces took direct responsibility for 
preserving law and order. The army 
commanders drastically reduced 
the civil liberties of the German 
population, but still followed all the 
provisions of the Hague Convention.85 
General Plumer adopted a 
policy of minimal interference in his 
guidelines for the administration of 
population. Civilian institutions were 
to continue; civilian authorities – the 
German police and courts – would 
enforce local laws and those passed 
by the military government. Yet, the 
British Army’s presence was clearly 
established by a new layer of courts 
imposed upon the German people. 
Summary courts and courts martial 
were established and staffed by the 
military authorities for transgressions 
against orders issued by the military 
government, or for offences against 
the military authority’s personnel or 
property. The penalties could be stiff: 
fines of up to 5,000 marks, prison, or 
death. 
The rules imposed on the German 
people were necessarily strict, to 
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control people’s movements, prevent 
espionage, and encourage respectful 
behaviour towards the British Army. 
All civilian rail, road and pedestrian 
traffic from the occupied territory 
to Germany (or any other country) 
was denied. Postal and telegraph 
communications were permitted, 
but heavily censored. But of all the 
new rules and regulations German 
citizens probably most hated two – a 
dusk to dawn curfew (1900 to 0600 
hours) and the requirement of men 
to tip their cap to Allied officers.86 
Over time, however, the rules were 
relaxed. Limits on movement within 
Allied territory were eased and 
the curfew was pushed back to 
midnight.87 To most Germans’ relief, 
the requirement to remove hats in the 
presence of occupation troops ended 
on 1 January 1919.88 
The system of administration 
imposed upon the German public 
was effective and did not burden 
the average Canadian soldier. 
Most military work associated 
with garrison duty was minimal, 
routine and boring. Patrol and guard 
duty were the most common tasks 
assigned to the Canadian Corps. 
The chief annoyance was restricting 
c iv i l i an  movements  be tween 
occupied territories and those still 
under German control. The lack 
of interpreters and a population 
unfamiliar with the rules caused 
many headaches for the soldiers on 
the outpost line. Smuggling was also a 
concern as a thriving black market for 
luxury goods and foodstuffs tempted 
some Germans to sneak contraband 
through Canadian lines. The busiest 
Canadian soldiers, however, proved 
to be the engineers, who repaired and 
constructed roads, bridges, sanitary 
facilities, and gun emplacements.89
Boredom and idleness became 
a serious issue. Officers recognized 
this and numerous education and 
entertainment programs were 
offered.90 At some levels of command, 
support for the educational scheme 
was strong. Canadian Corps HQ 
encouraged brigadiers and senior 
non-commissioned officers (NCOs) 
to give their “personal attention” to 
establishing a system of education 
and to arrange suitable hours for 
lectures and classes.91 The battalions 
were greatly assisted in their 
educational efforts by the Khaki 
University of Canada. Initially, the 
educational scheme met with some 
resistance below the corps level of 
command. Battalion officers were 
sceptical and when teachers were 
found, the officers were loath to take 
on extra responsibilities.92
 Most coveted by the troops were 
day passes to Cologne or Bonn. In the 
cities, Canadian soldiers could enjoy 
the baths, the cinema and the shops. 
At the battalion level, sightseeing 
trips were organized to Cologne, 
Bonn, the Drachenfels and Coblenz.93 
Tickets to a performance of the “See 
Toos” concert party were popular; 
free tickets to the opera were not.94 
The YMCA established canteen 
services, clubs, reading rooms and 
several theatres all of which were 
greatly enjoyed.95 
C a n a d i a n  C o r p s  H Q  h a d 
promised to look after the comforts 
of their soldiers and on paper they 
did so.96 In reality the troops were 
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Right: Canadian troops adopted the 
Scheumberg Palace in Bonn as their 
headquarters.
Below right: Scene during a performance 
in Bonn by the See Toos – the 2nd 
Canadian Division Concert Party.
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Ferguson of his compliance with the 
order, Currie wrote:
To receive the order that Cologne was 
out of bounds to Canadians would 
not have hurt, and I would have 
appreciated the Military Governor 
giving me privately his reasons for 
so doing, but to state that owing 
to continued misbehaviour the 
Canadian Troops were to be confined 
to the Canadian Corps Area can be 
considered nothing short of insulting. 
The only people who are confined in 
an area with pickets guarding all 
exits are criminals awaiting trial or 
serving their sentence, and I submit 
the Canadian Corps does not deserve 
this treatment. … The wording of this 
order is most bitterly resented, and I 
consider it should be withdrawn.103
In a meeting on 27 December, Currie 
put the matter before Plumer, 
demanding nothing less than a full 
apology from Ferguson. Plumer 
tried to laugh off the incident, but 
the matter was so serious to Currie 
that he threatened to take the matter 
directly to Field Marshal Sir Douglas 
Haig.104 Ferguson’s apology arrived 
the next day and the reputation of 
the Canadian Corps, while battered, 
remained intact. 
Despite the best efforts of the 
corps’ leadership to maintain strict 
discipline, some serious breaches 
of conduct happened and a small 
number of Canadians faced court 
martial. A survey of the infantry 
battalion and brigade courts martial 
records for the 1st and 2nd Canadian 
Divisions from 11 November 1918 
to 31 January 1919 reveals that 20 
soldiers were formally charged.105 
The three most frequent charges were 
disobeying a superior officer, being 
largely confined to the small towns in 
which they were billeted, and these 
offered little scope for diversion. The 
YMCA resources were limited and 
often could not reach the majority 
of soldiers scattered throughout the 
bridgehead. The brigades tried to 
organize concert parties, but largely 
without success. Some battalions 
arranged sightseeing trips and other 
excursions to urban centres, but the 
majority did not.97 For entertainment, 
Canada’s soldiers were largely left to 
their own devices. 
After the regular fatigues had 
finished, sports became the prime 
pastime. Nearby fields were converted 
into soccer pitches and baseball 
diamonds.98 Inter-company and 
inter-battalion soccer matches were 
scheduled. The largest organized 
sporting event by far was held on 18 
January – an interdivisional Sports 
Day between 2nd Canadian Division 
and 42nd American Division.99 As 
with the education scheme and other 
entertainments, sports events were 
designed to keep soldiers busy and 
out of trouble. 
T h e  s y s t e m  o f  m i l i t a r y 
administration coupled with the 
official and unofficial distractions 
for the soldiers proved generally 
effective. No major clashes between 
the Canadian military and the German 
public occurred and daily life went 
on much as always. There was little 
friendliness between the soldiers 
and inhabitants, but the discipline of 
the Canadian forces and the fairness 
of their behaviour were gratefully 
acknowledged by the townspeople.100 
The desire of Prime Minister Borden 
and General Currie for an incident-
free occupation would not be met. 
Canadian soldiers still managed to 
find trouble. The most infamous event 
occurred in Cologne on the evening 
of 26 December and resulted in the 
Canadian Corps being temporarily 
barred from the city. The exact nature 
of the incident is unknown,101 but the 
following morning Canadian Corps 
HQ received a telegram from General 
Sir Charles Ferguson, the British area 
military governor: 
Owing to continued misbehaviour 
of Canadian troops they will be 
confined to the Canadian Corps Area 
from 27th inst inclusive except when 
on duty. The Canadian Corps will 
piquet all exits from their area and 
in particular the entrance into the 
town of Cologne which is placed out 
of bounds to Canadians.102
Essentially, General Ferguson had 
turned the entire Canadian Corps 
Area into a prison camp. General 
Currie was furious because the 
Canadians’ reputation had been 
called into question. He responded 
with a letter to General Plumer, the 
ultimate authority in the British 
sector. After assuring General 
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“Sports Day” held on 18 January 1919 
on the Bonn University grounds between 
soldiers of the 2nd Canadian Division 
and the US 42nd Division.
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absent without leave (AWOL) and 
drunkenness. Twenty cases is not a 
large number considering the number 
of soldiers involved – approximately 
50,000. It is likely that two factors 
were to account for the low number 
of courts martial. First, the soldiers of 
the Canadian Corps were engaged in 
active service in unfamiliar territory 
during a state of apprehended war. 
Second, the educational scheme, 
entertainments, sports and other 
distractions were somewhat effective. 
Furthermore the 20 court martial 
cases were related to the maintenance 
of discipline, and had little to do with 
the German population. For example, 
on 9 December Private George Auger 
of the 27th Canadian Battalion was 
convicted of disobeying a superior 
officer. His crime was taking seven 
biscuits instead of four from an 
offered plate and refusing to give 
them back.106 On 20 December 1918, 
Private Eugene Bisonnett of the 
29th Battalion was convicted of 
disobeying the lawful command of 
a superior officer. He had refused to 
wash the company cook wagon when 
ordered.107 These two cases and many 
others demonstrate the benign nature 
of most of the crimes prosecuted.108 
Anything exotic in the experience 
of occupying German territory soon 
lost its appeal and demobilization 
plans quickly became the soldiers’ 
focus. The Canadian government, 
for sake of administrative expediency 
and lower costs, wanted to break 
up units and repatriate individuals 
based on length of service and marital 
status.109 That policy, Currie warned, 
would quickly break down discipline 
and morale in the corps, and greatly 
hamper support services. Currie 
prevailed. The Canadian Corps 
would return by units from England, 
where many of the men wanted 
leave to visit friends and family 
before returning to Canada.110 The 
question remained, however, which 
of Canada’s four divisions would be 
sent home first.
On 16 December, the Canadian 
Corps received some good news. Just 
as 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions 
had established themselves in the 
bridgehead, General Currie received 
the following telegram asking his 
views:
War Office order GHQ [to] dispatch 
400 men daily this month, 17,500 in 
January and 20,000 each succeeding 
month, and that two Canadian 
divisions be released for this 
purpose. GHQ desire 3rd Division 
to go in January – this owing to 
railway situation – and 1st Division 
in February.111
Currie would have preferred to send 
the divisions home based on the order 
in which they had arrived in Europe, 
yet, it was impossible to have the 1st 
Canadian Division concentrated near 
the French coast in time for it to leave 
in January. Thus, Currie reluctantly 
arranged for 3rd Canadian Division 
to be demobilized first.112 These 
demobilization plans were possible 
because by late December the 
logistics network in Western Europe 
was in much better repair and under 
less pressure. Thus the 1st Canadian 
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Above right: Soldiers of the 13th 
Canadian Infantry Battalion cheer as 
they board a train to start the long 
journey home.
Right: A pipe band leads the 15th 
Canadian Infantry Battalion to the train 
station as they depart Germany.
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Division began withdrawing from 
the Rhineland on 7 January and 2nd 
Canadian Division on 19 January. 
Officially, Canada’s commitment to 
the occupation ended on 26 January 
1919 as command of the Cologne 
bridgehead was handed over to X 
Corps at 1600 hours. 
There is little doubt that Canada’s 
soldiers were anxious to get home as 
quickly as possible. John A. Cooper 
wrote:
We were not glad to come, we 
were not anxious to stay, we were 
not sorry to go. Of course it is an 
honour to the Canadian Corps to 
have crossed the Rhine. It will be 
memorable in the history of some 
units. Nevertheless, as individuals 
we would just as soon have passed 
up the honour.113 
Currie as well noted the troops’ 
desire to leave: “They are very 
anxious to get home…We all want to 
get away from [the occupation] and 
are very glad that early in January 
we are to be moved.”114 Some soldiers 
had enjoyed their time in Germany. 
It had the effect of rounding off 
their  experience,  establishing 
awareness that the German Army 
had actually been defeated and that 
they themselves had taken part in 
that accomplishment. There may 
have been a tinge of regret when the 
Canadian Corps returned to Belgium. 
Their Belgian hosts had grown weary 
of soldiers, even their liberators, as 
their country had been continuously 
occupied since 1914. The soldiers 
of the Canadian Corps did not 
want to stop in Belgium, but would 
have preferred to carry on straight 
through to England and Canada. 
Their sojourn in Germany had ended 
and their duties were complete. All 
that was left was to return to Canada. 
For that trip home, however, the 
Canadian soldiers would have to wait 
a few more months.
* * * * *
The Canadian presence in the Rhineland lasted for only a brief 
period – a span of eight weeks from 
4 December 1918 to 6 February 
1919. Actual garrison duties lasted 
only three to five weeks. Despite its 
brevity, the march to and occupation 
of the Rhineland was a historic 
occasion for the Canadian Corps. 
Never before had they marched so 
far, approximately four hundred 
kilometres. This was the first time any 
British colony been asked to occupy 
the home territory of a European 
enemy. Yet, Canadian involvement in 
Germany was something of a fluke, a 
product of the unique circumstances 
existing in the aftermath of the First 
World War.
The divisions of the Canadian 
Corps were available for duties in 
Germany largely because shipping 
and, in Canada, rail capacity was 
unavailable for a quick repatriation 
in November 1918, which delayed 
the Canadian Corps’ demobilization 
plans. The British Army selected the 
corps for garrison duty precisely 
because i t  was avai lable  and 
Canadian.115 What the British Army 
needed in the aftermath of the First 
World War was time – time to 
demobilize its conscripted soldiers, 
reorganize, and occupy Germany 
with an all-volunteer force.116 The 
Canadian Corps, as well as other 
colonial forces, thus, in a small way, 
relieved some of the burdens on the 
British Army. 
The most important factor 
affecting the Canadian advance to 
the Rhineland was logistics. The 
difficulties of supply forced 3rd and 
4th Canadian Divisions to remain in 
Belgium and when the pack trains 
failed to arrive, soldiers went hungry. 
They marched on muddy roads, in 
worn-out boots, without the chance 
to shower. Still, discipline could not 
slip. Professional comportment and 
appearance was essential to maintain 
the reputation of the corps and the 
country in a high-profile assignment 
that signalled Canada’s increasing 
role in international affairs. Overall 
the court martial records indicate 
good behaviour on the part of the 
troops, albeit with some notable 
exceptions. 
Upon the conclusion of the 
First World War, Canadian soldiers 
desired nothing more than a quick 
return home. Yet, there was a sense 
of satisfaction when they learned 
they were to occupy Germany, a 
role that visibly recognized the 
part of Canada’s citizen soldiers in 
defeating the Germans. Despite the 
Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig talks to 
officers of the 2nd Canadian Division 
Headquarters in Germany while 
Lieutenant-General Currie looks on.
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hard marches, short rations and an 
indifferent German public, Canadian 
soldiers considered it an honour to be 
part of the Army of Occupation. The 
Canadian Corps’ brief commitment 
in the Rhineland was a mark of 
distinction, one to be remembered 
for many years to come.
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